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Francois-André Allaert1, Noël-Jean Mazen2, Louis Legrand3,4 and Catherine Quantin3,5,6*Abstract
Background: The market for Connected Health Devices (CHD) with healthcare applications is growing fast and
should be worth several billion euros in turnover in the coming years. Their development will completely transform
the organisation of our healthcare system, profoundly change the way patients are managed and revolutionizes
disease prevention.
Main body: The CHD with healthcare applications is a tidal wave that has societal impact calling into question the
privacy of patients’ personal and healthcare information and its protection in secure systems. Rather than trying to
stop the use of CHD, we must channel the wave by clearly examining the advantages versus the risks and threats
to the patients, and find counter-measures for implementation. The main difficulty is channeling the wave in a way
that is acceptable to CHD developers who otherwise will bypass the rules, even if they can be sued for it. Therefore,
it appears necessary to implement guidelines that can be used by all developers, defining the minimum requirement
for assuring the security of patient privacy and healthcare management.
Conclusion: In European Healthcare Systems, there is an imperative need for establishing security guidelines that CHD
producers could use to ensure compliance, so that patient privacy and healthcare management is safeguarded. The
aim would be to implement the guidelines a posteriori rather than a priori control so as not to hamper innovation.
Keywords: Connected health devices, Healthcare applications, Privacy, Protection, Security, Societal impactBackground
The evaluation of Connected Health Devices (CHD) raises
questions with regard to both public health and the pro-
tection of individual privacy. The answers to these ques-
tions will, without doubt, have an impact on the industrial
and economic success of the development of CHD. Dur-
ing a scientific symposium, held in France at the end of
2015, open to the general public, more than 500 partici-
pants including professionals from the pharmaceutical* Correspondence: catherine.quantin@chu-dijon.fr
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(http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zeindustry, the information technology industry and the
healthcare system debated the need for a technological
and ethical validation of CHD. These debates were chaired
by the Vice President of the National Medical Council,
and the Director of Public Relations and Research of the
national commission for data protection (CNIL). This dual
appraisal, involving society at large and the professional
world, brought to light and pinpointed not only the im-
mense potential of CHD, but also the obstacles to their
development and solutions that could be implemented.
This article addresses the potential security issues associ-
ated with CHD, which must be explored with regard to
the efficacy of the health service provided and to the pro-
tection of individual privacy.le is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
ive appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver
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system upside down
The global market for CHD with healthcare applications
is growing fast and should be worth several billion euros
in turnover in the coming years. Many economists believe
that their arrival will have a similar impact to that we
experienced with the development of the Internet. Today,
there are more than 97,000 downloadable healthcare ap-
plications, and hundreds of connected devices are already
on the market [1]. Most of the currently available CHD
with healthcare applications do not constitute major ad-
vances in themselves and can be considered gadgets rather
than medical devices. Nonetheless, some of them already
offer healthcare coaching services and advice, which may
be good or bad; it may impact on the users’ well-being or
their health. Similarities can be drawn, more or less, to the
way in which the Internet has affected patients experience
and knowledge in the face of serious illnesses [2]. Other
applications, via more invasive measurements, for
example, through the analysis of physiological cardiovas-
cular parameters, are moving into a real medical field. For
example, providing your doctor with information on your
blood pressure [3] from your application could lead to a
reaction from him/her if you have uncontrolled hyper-
tension. One could even imagine automatic regulation,
directly linked to blood pressure measurements, as is
already the case for insulin pumps [4, 5]. It is important
to underline that even the least sophisticated systems,
like a step counter [6], could eventually be diverted
from its original purpose in particular via certain infor-
mation transmission processes that transfer data to a
server. It is also easy to imagine that private health in-
surance companies may encourage clients to buy CHD
with their healthcare applications and accept the trans-
mission of information reflecting the clients’ healthy
lifestyle, in exchange for gifts or bonuses for the «good»
clients, and eventually higher insurance premiums for
the more negligent clients. There is a precedent for this
in the field of continuous positive pressure apparatus
used in the management of patients with sleep apnoea
syndrome. The apparatus is equipped with a chip that
records the duration of its use. For patients who do not
use the apparatus sufficiently, it may be taken away or
the cost may no longer be covered by the health insur-
ance agency. Following a complaint by certain patients’
associations, the French Council of State declared this
measure illegal in 2014, not because of the principle,
but simply because of legal considerations. They indi-
cated that this measure could not be based on a deci-
sion of the health insurance agency alone but required
a law, a law which may one day come into being. In the
field of road transport, there are also systems that ana-
lyse the behaviour of drivers, and insurers reward those
with a ‘less aggressive’ approach to driving.It is clear that, for the first time, it is possible to evalu-
ate the everyday behaviour of individuals using objective
criteria via connected devices. The use of such CHD will
increase and will impact every aspect of our lives, from
smoking and the consumption of alcohol or psycho-
tropic substances to compliance with treatments, or with
physical activity and dietary guidelines [7]. Will CHD
with healthcare applications eventually undermine our
principle of national healthcare solidarity and will they
lead to payment systems that vary depending on a per-
son’s risk profile? This is a major societal issue. However,
the possibility offered to people to pay for extra services
in the field of health must not be restricted and on the
contrary their widespread use may contribute to de-
crease their price and make them more affordable to
everybody.
Beyond the potential effects of CHD with healthcare
applications on healthcare management, they may also
affect the organisation of the whole healthcare system. It
is easy to imagine that in the very near future, systems
that transmit a person’s physiological parameters will
multiply; in a healthcare system that already has a short-
age of doctors. The doctors will have to cope with an in-
cessant flow of data to their practices; to avoid
saturation, expert systems need to be set up at the level
of the servers to reproduce the medical rationale and to
provide patients with appropriate “medical” advice. This
may be perfectly possible if such artificial intelligence
systems are properly validated and made secure [8–10].
This new organisation of healthcare would facilitate the
life of patients as well as that of doctors. However, the
limits of such re-organisation healthcare systems need to
be explored. Eventually, many patients could be followed
in this way, which would deprive the medical commu-
nity of part of its activities. This raises the major ques-
tion as to who will control these information systems,
which will play a substantial role in healthcare. What
will happen if companies that manage these systems
suddenly go bankrupt or if they decide to increase fees
to unbearable levels? One could also fear that they may
refuse to communicate information for a person to an-
other system, thus forcing the user to remain a “captive”
of the system that he/she initially subscribed to. The
competition laws and the freedom of choice for individ-
uals could be severely compromised. In addition, what
would be the consequences if an ill-intentioned person
hacked the system or if the system was based in a coun-
try with which economic or diplomatic tensions oc-
curred? This would without doubt raise questions about
the control, at least in Europe, of organisations likely to
manage healthcare information systems. Going further
on the way of a security policy analysis, we must also
take into account the “worse scenario”: an event which
has “obviously” a low probability of occurring but whose
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some companies selling cars are developing connected
devices which measure your alcohol level through
breath-analysers and may prevent you to start the car if
you have drunk too much. This could be effectively a
good thing to reduce car accidents. Imagine that a new
law on prohibition appears like between 1920 to 1933 in
the US and that the connected breath-analysers already
exist, people could have asked to have it permanently
connected to know if they are consuming alcohol. Im-
agine what could have been the possibility offered to the
Nazis to track people in 1939 through the database if
they were already available. They could have prosecuted
them or send them to reeducation camps! Things who
may appear good to us today may become a nightmare
tomorrow if we do not take measures to prevent the risk
of function creep. Some authors [11] have also imagined
that this could frighten our democracy through the vote
of the citizens.
Another challenge in the development of these CHD
with healthcare applications is maintaining equal access
to care for all. Many of these systems would provide an
aid to prevention, to diagnosis and to the therapeutic
follow-up of patients. However, one may fear that the in-
vestments necessary to set up such systems would make
their products relatively expensive. Given their proven
usefulness, they may need to be managed by a govern-
ment agency or by private or mutual insurance systems.
This could give rise to the appearance of a two-speed e-
medicine system, in which those who can afford it will
benefit from permanent follow-up, whereas the others
will have to make do with periodic consultations.
Finally, the CHD with healthcare applications may be
a way to make the young generations aware, for the first
time and directly, of prevention. This, indeed, underlines
one of the major weaknesses of the way prevention is
organised today, that is to say perceived as necessary
only by persons for whom the risk has become major. In
fact, measures to have a healthier lifestyle should be
followed from the earliest ages. Progress has certainly
been made, notably in healthy eating and sports activ-
ities, thanks to repeated messages in the media, but the
effort made and the cost have been immense compared
with the results [12], without taking into account the
fact that it takes years to affect the behaviour of our fel-
low citizens. Communicating prevention messages via
tools to which the young generations are particularly at-
tached, and using game-type strategies, could have a
positive effect and at last reach a target that until now
has been impervious to prevention messages.
Many other examples can be found to illustrate to
what extent these CHD and healthcare applications will
turn the organisation of our healthcare system upside
down, and yet, we have only tackled a minor part ofwhat will be available tomorrow, given the extremely
rapid technological progress [13–15].
Channel the wave rather than try to stop it
Given the potential of this tidal wave of CHD with
healthcare applications, where vested economic interests
are involved, it is unlikely to disappear and it is pointless
trying to stop it. Instead, it isfar better to channel it, in
order to generate a positive impact for patients, both
individually and at the level of the healthcare system as
a whole.
One of the key questions concerns the assessment of
technological and medical validation of CHD with
healthcare applications for their value as a veritable
healthcare service. Of course, in many fields, the issues
are not major and the impact will not be particularly im-
portant. For example, if a system that counts the num-
ber of steps per day does not perform very well, it will
be a matter of deceit on the product’s quality, which
from a legal point of view is unacceptable. However, the
issues are of another and more serious dimension, if we
consider a CHD that measures the aqueous humour of
the eye, then determines glycaemia and thus controls an
insulin pump. It is therefore important, in every medical
condition, to evaluate CHD according to objective
criteria.
Concerning the methodology, when such products
claim to provide a health service, they must be consid-
ered, according to the European Council Directive 93/
42/EEC of 14 June 1993 concerning medical devices.
They coveran extremely vast category of products com-
prising different classes (type I to IV) [of devices ranging
from sticking plasters to hip prostheses and from com-
pression stockings to pacemakers. A study of the reli-
ability and quality of measurements taken by a CHD is
essential. As it is often the case with evaluation of med-
ical devices, such studies should by randomized clinical
trials, or even observational studies conducted in every-
day practice, since even the notion of a comparator or a
blinded trial is difficult to imagine. The evaluation will
not give rise to hostile reactions from the designers or
producers of the CHD with healthcare applications, be-
cause what will be required of them will be “fair” and
proportional to medical safety concerns. The only mis-
givings of the companies present at the aforementioned
debate concerned not the principle, but the slow pace of
the regulatory procedures that govern clinical research
and today lead to delays of 6 months or more. Without
doubt, observational studies would be better suited than
randomized, controlled, double-blind clinical research
versus a comparator. It will be on the basis of these
studies that reimbursements for the CHD with health-
care applications, considered medical devices, could be
requested, provided that the brand name of the device is
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the health insurance agency.
The second question concerns the respect for and pro-
tection of individual privacy with regard to the informa-
tion collected and processed by these devices. The
framework for this evaluation is the law 78–17 of the
6th January, 1978, relative to information technologies,
to computer files and to privacy articles modified nu-
merous times, notably to incorporate the European dir-
ective 95/46/EC of the 24th October, 1995 relative to the
protection of personal data into French law. This text
states that any processing of personal information must
be declared and that any processing of personal health-
care data must be authorized beforehand. These proce-
dures aim to ensure that the systems provide the
necessary protection not only the confidentiality of data,
but also their integrity and their availability. These three
notions (confidentiality, integrity and availability) consti-
tute the pillars of data security, and thus underline that
confidentiality is not the only concern. Confidentiality is
of course an extremely fundamental notion as it has a
direct impact on the private life of patients, and implies
that only those authorized should have access to this in-
formation. Access to this information by a person with-
out authorization would be in violation of professional
secrecy as defined by the articles 226–13 and 14 of the
French penal code with regard to health data. The trans-
mission of files to an unauthorized party would be
regarded as diverting the file from its intended purpose,
which is punishable in article 226–16 of the penal code
by 5 years of imprisonment and a fine of 300,000 euros.
In the same way, the person responsible for the security
of computer system must implement the necessary mea-
sures to ensure that data are not damaged, or deformed,
or destroyed. Finally, and without prejudice, other rela-
tively restrictive measures, the fundamental rights of pa-
tients must be respected and notably their right to be
informed, their right of access to their information, to
rectify or to transfer their information, and their right to
“be forgotten” which means they have the right to have
information concerning them erased. It is perfectly pos-
sible to meet all of these different constraints, but as
soon as health data are involved, the procedures to re-
quest authorization are particularly long.
Companies consider this element particularly prejudi-
cial because these constraints indirectly lead to a distor-
tion of competition with regard to CHD with healthcare
applications. Indeed, the producers of the devices are lo-
cated in various countries, in particular the United
States or Asian countries, which do not have the same
level of protection of individual information privacy. Of
course, in law, all products available in the European
Union are subject to the same obligations with regard to
the protection of individual privacy. However, thesanctions and the means of reprisal with regard to non-
European companies that sell their products over the
Internet are difficult to implement, which gives them
relative impunity.
An approach, called Privacy by Design is gaining
greater and greater importance. It includes the respect
of privacy even earlier in the project, as early as the de-
sign stage, by ensuring the pertinence of the data col-
lected and by anticipating the information provided to
and the rights of access of users [16].
However, CHD providers must be conscious that
technological development in re-identification of de-
identified patient data has become a major policy concern.
As reported by Lee Tien [17], only in the past few years
we have begun to realize how difficult it is to truly de-
identify data, given the enormous amount of information
about people that is publicly available to data-miners, in-
cluding hospital discharge summary databases. Modern
re-identification techniques do not depend on personally
identifiable information - any information that distin-
guishes one person from another can be useful. Re-
searchers recently used modern techniques to re-identify
supposedly anonymized genetic samples - determining
not just the names of some of the people who submitted
the sample in the first place but also their entire families.
It is also important that CHD providers anticipate in their
technical development the required counter-measures to
the main threats, which can jeopardise data integrity and
therefore patients’ health. As expressed by Ohno-Machado
[18], a particular attention has to be paid to replay attack
and External Device Mis-Bonding. In a replay-attack, a
valid data transmission could be maliciously repeated by a
hacker. For example, an attacker can first record the com-
munication from the sensor that indicates a high glucose
level based on some auxiliary knowledge about the victim.
Then, the attacker could later retransmit the high glucose
information pretending it is a “valid” message, which would
cause the receiver (e.g., insulin pump) to deliver an incor-
rect insulin dose and put the patient at risk. One way to
avoid replay attacks is to introduce timestamps [19] within
the message, where one CHD with healthcare applications
only accepts the message from the other device if the time-
stamp in the received message is within a reasonable time
tolerance range. In this case, a replay attack would not be
able to provide a valid timestamp by simply reusing the pre-
viously sniffed transmission. However, time stamping re-
quires synchronization with mHealth devices, which may
impose additional communication burden and reduces bat-
tery life. Concerning DMB attack, two system security is-
sues have to be taken into account: the information leakage
risk and the information injection risk. For the first type, a
malicious “app” on an authorized phone can steal sensitive
patient data that are intended to be transmitted to an au-
thorized app. In terms of information injection risk, an
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the original authorized app by intercepting the connec-
tion between the authorized external device and the au-
thorized smartphone. This injection risk is extremely
dangerous for patients who are heavily relying on
health monitoring apps (e.g., blood-sugar concentra-
tion, irregular heart rhythm, etc.).
The solutions: a posteriori control and the
establishment of standards
Today, what differentiates the evaluation of usual medical
devices from that of an application or a CHD is essentially
that many of the latter are likely to include recordings of
personal data; in addition, these devices will be used by
large numbers of people, which gives the societal dimen-
sion and is likely to compromise individual privacy. Com-
panies accept the legitimacy of the protections and
guarantees required, but criticize the excessively long de-
lays, which, as well as distorting competition, as already
pointed out, will constitute a major intrinsic handicap for
products whose lifespan is often very short. Any delay of a
few months may render the device obsolete even before it
has been authorized.
One of the proposals made on the occasion of the afore-
mentioned symposium devoted to the technological and
ethical evaluation of these healthcare applications, was to
allow prior auto-certification by the manufacturer associ-
ated with an a posteriori control procedure to assess the
measures implemented in the devices to protect individual
privacy.
This auto-certification and a posteriori control process
would constitute a guarantee while preserving the rapidity
of authorization; it would require two essential elements:
a standard and control measures.
The standard is fundamental in that each CHD manu-
facturer must have full knowledge of what commitments
he has to make. The good or poor behaviour of the manu-
facturer will be measured against this standard, which will
be established by all of the actors in the field, by the enter-
prises, of course, but in collaboration with healthcare pro-
fessionals and associations of users of the healthcare
system. A focus group will be set up at the national level
to lay the foundations for this work by drafting recom-
mendations. These will constitute the minimal prerequi-
sites that must be respected with regard to data processing
by the CHD with healthcare applications. The recommen-
dations will then be submitted to the National Medical
Council, and the national commission for data protection
(CNIL) in France for approval. Contact will be made with
European institutions to envisage their extension to differ-
ent countries in the European Union.
With regard to control measures and sanctions, they
have already been provided for in the French law relative
to the protection of personal data in the context ofmissions assigned to the CNIL, which is an administra-
tive authority. In terms of personnel, the human re-
sources of the CNIL are already insufficient to handle all
of the tasks assigned to it, and the exponential develop-
ment of CHD may overwhelm the departments that de-
liver the authorizations. The consequence would be an
increase in delays, the proportion of which would be-
come completely intolerable. This is why it seems advan-
tageous to promote a posteriori controls, which would
require far fewer resources. It could be hoped that fear
of the “policeman” will be sufficiently effective, on con-
dition that a certain number of controls are indeed done.
A posteriori control, if it is real, often encourages inter-
ested parties to take more precautions than is the case
with a priori controls: if there is a problem, it is the
whole structure and the totality of their investments that
will collapse, without the possibility of negotiation and
with the risk of heavy fines and even imprisonment.
Conclusion
The market for Connected Health Devices (CHD) with
healthcare applications is growing fast and should be
worth several billion euros in turnover in the coming
years. Their development will completely transform the
organisation of European healthcare systems, change the
way patients are managed and revolutionize disease pre-
vention.. The new organisation should facilitate the life of
patients as well as of doctors. However, the limits of such
a system need to be explored, and the major question as
to who will control these information systems should be
discussed.
Many issues regarding the technological and medical
validation of CHD with healthcare applications have to be
addressed. These include the assessment of their value as
a veritable healthcare service and guarantees that individ-
ual privacy is respected with regard to the information
collected and processed by these devices. The societal
consequences of CHD with healthcare applications have
to be assessed. The need for a medical as well as ethical
evaluation, and for security guidelines, which producers of
connected devices could use to ensure compliance. Rather
than trying to stop this tidal wave, we propose the imple-
mentation of a posteriori rather than a priori checks so as
not to hamper innovation.
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